Enhancing Gradient-based Attacks with Symbolic Intervals by Wang, Shiqi et al.
Enhancing Gradient-based Attacks with Symbolic Intervals
Shiqi Wang 1 Yizheng Chen 1 Ahmed Abdou 2 Suman Jana 1
Abstract
Recent breakthroughs in defenses against adver-
sarial examples, like adversarial training, make
the neural networks robust against various classes
of attackers (e.g., first-order gradient-based
attacks). However, it is an open question whether
the adversarially trained networks are truly robust
under unknown attacks. In this paper, we present
interval attacks, a new technique to find adversar-
ial examples to evaluate the robustness of neural
networks. Interval attacks leverage symbolic inter-
val propagation, a bound propagation technique
that can exploit a broader view around the current
input to locate promising areas containing adver-
sarial instances, which in turn can be searched
with existing gradient-guided attacks. We can ob-
tain such a broader view using sound bound propa-
gation methods to track and over-approximate the
errors of the network within given input ranges.
Our results show that, on state-of-the-art adver-
sarially trained networks, interval attack can find
on average 47% relatively more violations than
the state-of-the-art gradient-guided PGD attack.
1. Introduction
Deep learning systems have achieved strong performance at
large scale. However, attackers can easily locate adversarial
examples that are perceptibly the same as the original
images and misclassified by state-of-the-art deep learning
models. Making Neural Networks (NNs) robust against
adversarial inputs has resulted in an arms race between new
defenses and attacks that break them. Recent breakthroughs
in defenses can make NNs robust against various classes
of attackers, including state-of-the-art Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) attack. In (Madry et al.,
2018a), Madry et al. argued that PGD attacks are the
“ultimate” first-order attacks by preliminary tests. They
adversarially retrain the networks with violations found by
PGD to obtain robustness. Such training procedure is called
adversarial training. The conclusion is that training models
with PGD attacks can gain robustness against all first-order
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gradient attacks.
Nonetheless, the adversarially trained networks might not be
truly robust against unknown attacks even if it has good ro-
bustness against state-of-the-art attacks like PGD. Since neu-
ral networks are highly non-convex, there is high chance that
the existing attacks will miss many adversarial examples.
The main challenge behind locating adversarial examples
using gradients as guidance is that the search process can
get stuck at local optima. Therefore, we hope to have a
special first-order gradient that can offer a broader view
within surrounding area, potentially guiding us towards the
worst-case behavior of neural networks.
Our critical insight is that we can obtain such a broader
view by existing sound over-approximation methods. These
methods are sound. It means the estimated output ranges
are guaranteed to always over-approximate the ground-truth
ranges (i.e., never miss any adversarial examples but might
introduce false positives). For convenience, we call these
methods sound bound propagation. Recently,
they have been successfully used for verifiable robust
training (Wong et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Wang et al.,
2018a; Gowal et al., 2018). For each step of training, the
weights of the networks are updated with the gradients of the
verifiable robust loss provided by sound propagation meth-
ods over given input ranges. We borrow a similar idea for
our attacks by proposing a generic way to extract and apply
the gradient from the output provided by these methods.
Essentially, sound propagation methods relax the input
range into various abstract domains (e.g., zonotope (Gehr
et al., 2018), convex polytope (Wong & Kolter, 2018), and
symbolic interval (Wang et al., 2018b;c)) and propagate
them layer by layer until we have an over-approximated
output abstract domain. The gradient that encodes a broader
view within surrounding area can be obtained from such
abstract domains of the outputs. It can guide us toward a
promising sub-area. In Figure 1, we show the symbolic
interval and its interval gradient gI as an example to
illustrate their effectiveness on the attack performance.
In this paper, we describe such a novel gradient-based
attack, interval attack, which is the first attack
framework to combine both sound bound propagation
method and existing gradient-based attacks. Here, we focus
specifically on symbolic interval analysis as our sound
bound propagation. However, our attack is generic. It can
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Figure 1: The difference between regular gradient g and
interval gradient gI . Figure (a) illustrates that PGD attacks
using regular gradients might get stuck at l1. Figure (b)
shows that interval gradient gI over an input region B0
allows us to avoid such problem and successfully locate the
violation l2. Here Equp and Eqlow are the symbolic upper
and lower bounds of the output found by one type of sound
bound propagation method, symbolic interval analysis (Wang
et al., 2018b;c).
be adapted to leverage any other sound bound propagation
methods and their corresponding gradient values. The
interval attack contains two main steps: it (1) uses interval
gradient to locate promising starting points where the
surrounding area has the worst-case behaviors indicated
by the sound propagation methods, and (2) uses strong
gradient-based attacks to accurately locate the optima
within the surrounding area. Such design is due to the fact
that the sound bound propagation will introduce overesti-
mation error and prevent convergence to an exact optima
if only relying on interval gradient. Specifically, such
overestimation error is proportional to the width of the input
range (e.g., 0 in Figure 2). To achieve the best performance
by encoding the broader view of the surrounding area, we
design a strategy (Section 2) to dynamically adjust the
range used for each step of the interval attack.
We implement our attack with symbolic interval analysis
and evaluate it on three MNIST models that are trained with
the state-of-the-art defense, adversarial training (Madry
et al., 2018a). Interval attack is able to locate on average
47% relatively more adversarial examples than PGD
attacks. We also evaluate our attack on the model from
MadryLab MNIST Challenge (Madry et al., 2018b), which
is considered to be the most robust model on the MNIST
dataset so far. On this model, interval attack has achieved
the best result than all of the existing attacks. Code of
interval attack is available at: https://github.com/
tcwangshiqi-columbia/Interval-Attack.
2. Interval attack
In this section, we first motivate the need for stronger
attacks by analyzing the loss distribution found by PGD
attacks with 105 different random starting points. Then we
dive into the definition of interval gradients and details of
interval attack procedure.
Why we need stronger attack? PGD attack is so far a well-
known and a standard method to measure the robustness of
trained NNs. Madry et al. even argued that PGD attacks are
the “ultimate” first-order attacks, i.e., no other first-order at-
tack will be able to significantly improve over the solutions
found by PGD (Madry et al., 2018a). In order to support
the statement, Madry et al. performed 105 iterations of the
PGD attack from random starting points within bounded
L∞-balls of test inputs and showed that all the solutions
found by these instances are distinct local optima with simi-
lar loss values. Therefore, they concluded that these distinct
local optima found by PGD attacks are very close to the
best solution that can be found by any first-order attacker.
In Figure 2, we demonstrate such assumption to be flawed
with our first-order interval attacks. Essentially, for each
random starting point, instead of directly applying PGD
attack, interval attack will first use sound bound propagation
to locate promising sub-area and then apply PGD attacks.
We randomly picked two different images on which PGD
attacks cannot find violations but the interval attacks can,
and then we repeated the same tests in (Madry et al., 2018a)
for PGD, CW, and interval attacks. On both images, regular
PGD attacks cannot find any violation even with 105 random
starts. The losses found by PGD attacks are very concen-
trated between 0 and 1, which is consistent with the observa-
tions in (Madry et al., 2018a). Similarly, the losses of CW at-
tacks on these images show concentrated distribution. How-
ever, interval attacks can locate promising sub-area and use
the same PGD attacks to offer a much larger range of loss
distribution. Particularly, it can find over 50, 000 violations
out of the same 105 starting points. Therefore, the method
of Madry et al. (Madry et al., 2018a) cannot provide robust-
ness against all first-order adversaries even if the model is
robust against PGD attacks with 105 random starting points.
Interval gradient (gI ). As described in Section 1, any
existing sound bound propagation method can be a good
fit in our interval attack. In this paper, we use symbolic
interval analysis to provide tight output bounds (Wang et al.,
2018b;c). Essentially, such analysis produces two parallel
linear equations (Equp and Eqlow shown in Figure 1) to
tightly bound the output of each neuron. Compared to
other types of sound bound propagation, symbolic interval
analysis provides tight over-approximation while its interval
gradient can be easily accessed.
Based on that, we define the interval gradient gI to be
equal to the slope of these parallel lines. For example,
let us assume symbolic interval analysis propagates input
range x = [0, 1] and finally provides the bounds of a neural
network’s output as [2x, 2x+3] through the network. Then,
the interval gradient will be d([2x,2x+3])dx = 2.
For other sound bound propagation methods that do
not have parallel output bounds, we can estimate the
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Figure 2: Distributions of the loss values from robustness violations found by PGD attacks (blue), CW attacks (green), and
interval attack (red) with 100,000 random starts within the allowable input range B(x). The loss values found by CW and
PGD attacks are very small and concentrated. However, interval attack shows there are still many distinct violations with much
larger loss values.
interval gradients with average gradients (slope) of all the
corresponding output bounds. Here we give one generic
definition of interval gradients. Assume the output range
provided by sound bound propagation is presented in the
form of abstract domain as Eqi(i = 1, ..., n), then the
interval gradient can be estimated by:
gI =
1
n
n∑
i
dEqi
dx
Note that how to choose the best sound bound propagation
methods and how to estimate interval gradients worth further
discussion. Here we just provide one possible solution that
has good empirical results with symbolic interval analysis.
Algorithm 1 Interval Attack
Inputs: x← target input, ← attack budget
Parameters: t: iterations, α: step size, 0: starting point,
p: input region step size
Output: x′ ← perturbed x
1: x′ = x
2: for i← 1 to t do
3: ′0 = 0
4: // The smallest 0 that can potentially cause violations
5: while Safe analyzed by sound bound propagation do
6: ′0 = ′0 ∗ p
7: if ′0 >= /2 then
8: break // Prevent 0 being too large
9: end if
10: end while
11: gI = ∇xEq // Interval gradient of symbolic intervals
12: x′ = x′ + αgI
13: // Bound x′ within allowable input ranges
14: x′ = clip(x′, x− , x+ )
15: if argmax(fθ(x′)) 6= y then
16: return x′
17: end if
18: end for
19: PGD Attack(x′)
20: return x′
Interval attack details. Algorithm 1 shows how we im-
plement the interval attack. The key challenge is to find a
suitable value of 0 representing the input region over which
the interval gradient will be computed (Line 3 to Line 11) at
each iteration of the interval-gradient-based search. If 0 is
too large, the symbolic interval analysis will introduce large
overestimation error leading to the wrong direction. On the
other hand, if 0 is too small, the information from the sur-
rounding area might not be enough to make a clever update.
Therefore, we dynamically adjust the size of 0 during the at-
tack. Specifically, we allow a hyperparameter p to be tuned
during the attack procedure which controls the step size for
searching 0 as Line 7. Since 0 is usually small such that the
sound bound propagation tends to be accurate. We can then
pick the smallest 0 that will cause potential violations in re-
laxed output abstract domain. The suitable interval gradient
for that abstract domain can thus be accessed within such 0.
After a bounded number of iterations with interval gradients,
we use PGD attack with a starting point from the promising
sub-area identified by the interval-gradient-based search
to locate a concrete violation as shown in Line 21.
3. Evaluation
Setup. We implement symbolic interval analysis (Wang
et al., 2018c) and interval attack on top of Tensorflow
1.9.0 1. All of our experiments are run on a GeForce
GTX 1080 Ti.
We evaluate the interval attack on three neural networks
MNIST FC1, MNIST FC2 and MNIST Conv. The network
details are shown in Table 1. All of these networks are
trained to be adversarially robust using the Madry et al.’s
technique (Madry et al., 2018a). For PGD attacks, we use
40 iterations and 0.01 as step size. We define the robustness
region, B(x), to be bounded by L∞ norm with  = 0.3
over normalized inputs (76 out of 255 pixel value). We
use the 1,024 randomly selected images from the MNIST
test set to measure accuracy and robustness. MNIST FC1
contains two hidden layers each with 512 hidden nodes
and achieves 98.1% test accuracy. Similarly, MNIST FC2
contains five hidden layers each with 2,048 hidden nodes
and achieves 98.8% test accuracy. MNIST Conv was
1https://www.tensorflow.org/
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Network # Hidden units # Parameters ACC (%) Attack success rate (%)PGD CW Interval Attack Interval Attack Gain
MNIST FC1 1,024 668,672 98.1 39.2 42.2 56.2 +17 (43%)
MNIST FC2 10,240 18,403,328 98.8 34.4 32.2 44.4 +10.0 (38%)
MNIST Conv 38,656 3,274,634 98.4 7.2 7.3 11.6∗ +4.4 (61%)
* Interval attack achieves the best attack success rate in MadryLab MNIST Challenge (Madry et al., 2018b).
Table 1: Attack success rates of PGD, CW and interval attack ( = 0.3) on MNIST FC1, MNIST FC2 and MNIST Conv. All
of the networks are adversarially robust trained using PGD attacks with  = 0.3 (Madry et al., 2018a). The interval attack gain
is computed as an increase over the success rate of PGD attack and the relative improvement percentage shown in parenthesis.
adversarially robust trained by Madry et al. (Madry et al.,
2018a) and was released publicly as part of the MadryLab
MNIST Challenge (Madry et al., 2018b). The model uses
two convolutional layers and two maxpooling layers to
achieve 98.4% test accuracy, on which the PGD attack
success rate is only 7.2%.
Attack effectiveness. The interval attack is very effective
at finding violations in all of the MNIST models. We
compared the strength of the interval attack against the
state-of-the-art PGD and CW attacks, as shown in Table 1.
For the first two models, we give the same amount of attack
time. The iterations for PGD and CW are around 7,200
for MNIST FC1 and 42,000 for MNIST FC2. We ran the
interval attack for 20 iterations against MNIST FC1 and
MNIST FC2, which took 53.9 seconds and 466.5 seconds
respectively. The interval attack is able to achieve from 38%
to 61% relative increase in the attack success rate of PGD.
On the MNIST Conv network from the MadryLab MNIST
Challenge, interval attack achieves the highest success rate
compared to all of the existing attacks.
Our results show that using only first-order gradient
information, the interval attack can significantly improve
the attack success rate over that of the PGD and CW attacks
in adversarially robust networks.
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Figure 3: Adversarially robust training using the interval
attack does not converge well compared to using PGD attacks,
given 12 hours of training time on the MNIST Small network
with L∞ ≤ 0.3. The estimated robust accuracy of training
using PGD attacks (Madry et al., 2018a) quickly converges
to 89.3% ERA, while training using the interval attack takes
significantly longer to converge.
Inefficiency of adversarially robust training with inter-
val attack. One obvious way of increasing the robustness
of trained networks against interval-based attacks is to use
such attacks for adversarial training. However, due to the
high overhead introduced by sound bound propagation
methods, robust training with interval attack often struggle
to converge. To demonstrate that, we evaluated adversarial
robust training using interval attack on MNIST Small
network for L∞ ≤ 0.3. As shown in Figure 3, even
after 12 hours of training time for such a small network,
the interval-based adversarially robust training does not
converge as well as its PGD-based counterpart. To achieve
the same 80% ERA, such interval-based adversarially
robust training takes around 15.5 hours which is 47 times
slower than its PGD-based counterpart. The gap will be
further widened on larger networks.
Therefore, instead of improving the adversarially robust
training schemes, recent verifiably robust training is a
promising direction, which can fundamentally improve
the verifiable robustness and defend against stronger
attackers (Wong et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Wang
et al., 2018a; Gowal et al., 2018).
4. Related work
Many defenses against adversarial examples have been
proposed (Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Papernot et al., 2015; Cisse
et al., 2017; Papernot & McDaniel, 2017; 2018; Athalye
et al., 2018; Buckman et al., 2018; Song et al., 2017; Xie
et al., 2017; Zantedeschi et al., 2017), which are followed
by a sequence of stronger attacks breaking them in quick
succession (Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b;
Elsayed et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016; Biggio et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2018;
Papernot et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017; He et al., 2017; Atha-
lye & Sutskever, 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Pei et al.,
2017; Tian et al., 2018). We refer the interested readers to
the survey by Athalye et al. (Athalye et al., 2018) for more
details. In spite of large amounts of attacks, the adversarially
trained model (Madry et al., 2018a) remains robust against
known attacks. One attack paper (He et al., 2018) that
breaks the region-based defense (Cao & Gong, 2017) also
uses the region information. However, their surrounding
area estimation, unlike us, is based on sampling and thus
may miss violations compared to the interval attack.
5. Conclusion
We propose a novel type of gradient-based attacks which
is the first generic attack framework to combine sound
bound propagation methods with existing gradient-based
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attacks. By plotting the loss distributions found by interval
attack with 105 random starting points, we are able to show
that PGD attack is not the ultimate first-order adversary.
On three adversarially trained MNIST networks, interval
attack can provide on average 47% relative improvement
over PGD attacks. In MadryLab MNIST challenge (Madry
et al., 2018b), it achieves the best performance so far. The
empirical results show that there is valuable research space
seeking for stronger attacks by applying tighter sound
bound propagation methods and stronger first-order attacks.
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